Mainstream Media in Greece: Small-scale Bias Experiment on Information Scientists

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Abstract

The aim of this study was to assess whether fact-checking methods improve the critical evaluation of news content and mainstream media outlets that disseminate it, and to what extent personal biases influence these assessments. The study explored these through a controlled pilot experiment involving eight academic information scientists and including audio excerpts from six Greek mainstream television channels, all reporting on the same political event, anonymized to ensure blind evaluations. Participants completed a questionnaire incorporating Pew Research Center tools to assess their political orientations and they applied the Media Bias/Fact Check methodology. Findings reveal high perceived bias in all evaluated media outlets, with stronger right-wing classifications emerging when the identities of the outlets were known. Predominantly left-leaning participants demonstrated improved evaluative consistency using MBFC; however, ideological leanings still influenced outcomes. The study highlights the persistence of confirmation bias among trained individuals and underscores the complexity of achieving objective media evaluations. This work contributes to Media and Information Literacy by piloting a replicable framework for detecting bias in mainstream media and in individuals. While limited in scale, it offers valuable insights for future large-scale studies and educational interventions aimed at enhancing critical media consumption and reducing susceptibility to misinformation.

Keywords: fact-check, mainstream media, bias, media and information literacy.

1. Introduction

The mass media is a force to be reckoned in today's modern society. It serves as a critical agent in distributing news and information on a global scale. Throughout history, it has taken many forms, from wooden plates in Rome to newspapers with the invention of the printing press. It continues with radio, television, and the Internet as we know it today. The media is essential for shaping public opinion and influencing social and political discourse. With its potential to inform and influence the public, mass media has become a powerful tool for those who control it, offering worldwide reach and access to diverse demographics (Conboy, Steel, 2015).

The mass media plays a gatekeeping role in controlling the flow of information. However, this role can contribute to a distorted image of society, as limited time for news coverage forces the media to selectively present content to the public. To illustrate this point, one may consider the limitations of a window in a house, which cannot provide a comprehensive view of the world. The time available for reporting cannot encompass the entirety of an event in an article or report, except in a selective manner. This selectivity in the presentation of information creates a fertile ground for the possibility of agenda setting (McCombs, 2014).

The agenda, and particularly the theory of agenda setting, refers to how the media's selective coverage assigns disproportionate value to societal problems that can be considered important.

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This theory is based on two key components. The first highlights that the media filters what we see by prioritizing issues that capture the public's attention, rather than those essential to their daily lives or livelihoods. The second component addresses the attention that the media gives to societal issues; particularly, the more attention it devotes, the higher its value becomes in the eyes of citizens. In other words, the media does not dictate what to think or how to think about specific issues; it merely signals which issues we should pay more attention to (McCombs, 2014).

The mass media's significant power to select and frame content plays a crucial role in guiding public opinion and shaping how people perceive current events and issues. Beyond informing, the media can challenge dominant ideologies, influence political attitudes, and establish cultural norms. This influential role has sparked ongoing debates about the limits of media freedom, particularly in democratic societies, where the media is expected to function both as a mirror of society and as a watchdog. Concerns also persist about the concentration of media ownership and the impact of commercial and political interests, which may undermine journalistic independence. These issues are further intensified in the digital age, where algorithms and corporate agendas add new layers of complexity to an already fragmented media landscape (McChesney, 2015).

The narratives and the voices that mass media choose to highlight can have a devastating impact on society if not handled ethically. By bringing topics into public awareness through specific interpretive lenses, the media can influence public opinion, political debates, and policymaking, to name a few. These selective practices may validate some worldviews and marginalize others, reinforce systemic inequality, or, conversely, empower social movements and previously silenced voices. In this sense, media do not merely reflect societal values; they actively construct them, often becoming a powerful agent of historical change and social evolution (Couldry, 2012).

On the other hand, information science professionals serve as vital navigators in today's oversaturated information landscape. With the enormous growth of digital content, misinformation, and algorithm-driven platforms, their role extends beyond information retrieval and management to encompass information literacy among the public. Information literacy is a set of competencies, and social practice deeply embedded in context (Lloyd, 2010). Moreover, information professionals must maintain a high level of literacy and critical thinking skills to model best practices (Julien, Genuis, 2011). This requires engaging with the evolving nature of digital information production and dissemination environments.

To empower communities, there is a need to communicate the operations of mass media and educate people on how media shapes narratives and public perceptions. Information scientists can bridge this gap by integrating media and information literacy into their outreach efforts, helping individuals become conscious consumers and ethical information producers. Media literacy involves understanding the media's role in democratic participation and societal power dynamics (Mihailidis, Thevenin, 2013) and critical media literacy is essential for civic engagement that can be fostered through education which blends technological and analytical skills (Hobbs, 2010). Therefore, information professionals need to internalize these concepts, ensuring their deep understanding before disseminating them to the public.

Furthermore, one of the main aspects of critical thinking in today's rich media environment is to acknowledge and eliminate self-bias, because it contributes to polarization, diminishes trust in the news media, and obstructs effective collective action against misinformation. Research shows that intense political partisanship makes people more likely to believe they are better at spotting fake news than those who hold opposing political views (Sude et. al., 2023). A crucial question is how effectively well-informed information scientists can empower others to engage in critical news consumption while also remaining aware of, and resistant to their own biases, particularly self-enhancing perceptual biases.

Considering these issues, the present work presents an experiment that examines the relationship between the news published by mainstream media in Greece and its perception and evaluation by a small target group of experienced information scientists. Although this work is a small-scale experiment focusing on Greek media, it seeks to complement the broader international discourse on this subject by encouraging researchers to further test its efficacy and validity under diverse circumstances, namely, to serve as a pilot or model for scaled studies in academic environments.

2. Materials and methods

The methodological approach involved a small-scale, anonymous experiment designed to explore two key research questions:

Q1: How effectively can an individual, specifically an information scientist, evaluate news when well-informed about a fact-checking method applied to media outlets and news items?

Q2: To what extent does personal bias influence their evaluation outcomes?

The experiment took place in September 2022 and involved a targeted participant group consisting of 18 full-time teaching staff members from the Department of Archival, Library, and Information Studies at the University of West Attica. This group was selected based on the assumption that their academic background in various areas of information science would enable them to understand a fact-checking method more effectively than individuals with less expertise. Moreover, their professional experience was expected to support a more objective evaluation of news content, potentially with a lower susceptibility to bias.

Out of the 18 individuals invited, 8 full-time faculty members agreed to participate in the anonymous experiment, representing approximately 44 % of the total.

In the first stage, 9 mainstream Greek television channels were identified: *ANT1* (Antenna TV, 2025), *ALPHA* (Alpha TV, 2025), *ERT1* (ERT, 2025), *ERT2* (ERT, 2025), *ERT3* (ERT, 2025), *MEGA* (MEGA TV, 2025), *OPEN* (Open TV, 2025), *SKAI* (Skai TV, 2025), and *STAR* (Star Channel, 2025). Using data from Nielsen (Nielsen Audience Measurement, 2022), a trusted source for television ratings, the viewing statistics from September 26 to October 2, 2022 (coinciding with the planned experiment period) were analyzed. Two channels with significantly lower audience shares were excluded based on these ratings.

The next phase involved reviewing the websites of the 7 remaining channels (*ANT1*, *ALPHA*, *ERT1* referred to as *ERT*, *MEGA*, *OPEN*, *SKAI*, and *STAR*), which typically feature video excerpts from their news bulletins. The aim was to identify a single political news item that had been reported across all selected channels, enabling a horizontal comparison of how different media outlets presented the same event. Among the major issues in Greek political discourse at the time was the 2022 Greek surveillance scandal (Wikipedia contributors, 2024), hereafter referred to as *Eavesdropping*, which was ultimately chosen as the news item for the experiment.

However, excerpts of the selected news item were not available on all channel websites, posing a challenge to the experiment. To address this, the researchers turned to the official YouTube channels of the 7 selected media outlets. Video segments relevant to *Eavesdropping* were located on the YouTube channels of 6 broadcasters, with *SKAI* being the exception; during the study's planning period, the *SKAI* channel did not host any video content related to *Eavesdropping*. Consequently, *SKAI* was excluded from the final sample.

The 6 remaining video excerpts, relevant to *Eavesdropping*, were converted into MP3 audio files to obscure the identity of each media outlet. These anonymized audio clips were then embedded into the experiment's main tool, namely the questionnaire.

To examine how participants' political beliefs might influence their assessment of news items, the study incorporated a political typology developed by the *Pew Research Center* (Pew Research Center, 2021). Integrating this tool into the questionnaire enabled researchers to determine each participant's political profile and combine it with their Media Bias/Fact Check evaluations, hereafter *MBFC of 2022* (Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022).

To construct the scientific framework of the questionnaire, the research employed *MBFC of 2022* (Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022). Founded in 2015 by Dave M. Van Zandt, *MBFC* evaluates political bias and factual reporting using a combination of objective measures and subjective analysis. For the purposes of this study, *MBFC of 2022* was chosen for its established reputation in media research and its capacity to assess sources based on four main criteria: (1) wording and headlines, (2) fact-checking and sourcing, (3) story selection, and (4) political affiliation. Additional subcategories included bias by omission and use of language. *MBFC of 2022* rates factual reporting on a seven-point scale and categorizes political bias along a spectrum from extreme-left to extreme-right. Other labels, such as Pro-science, Conspiracy/Pseudoscience, and Satire, are also used for classification purposes.

The platform relied on independent reviewers affiliated with the International Fact-Checking Network and adheres to its Code of Principles (International Fact-Checking Network, 2025). While *MBFC of 2022* had been widely adopted in academic and professional contexts, often showing strong agreement with ratings from other platforms like *NewsGuard Technologies* and *BuzzFeed India* (NewsGuard Technologies, 2025; BuzzFeed India, 2025), it had also faced criticism. Scholars and institutions such as the Poynter Institute had questioned its scientific rigor (Funke, Mantzarlis, 2018; Pennycook, Rand, 2019). The *Columbia Journal Review* had also pointed out its

susceptibility to subjective judgment (Wilner, 2018). Nonetheless, *MBFC of 2022* remained a widely used tool for evaluating media bias and misinformation, contributing to projects like the *Iffy Quotient*, which tracks the spread of unreliable information on social media (Center for Social Media Responsibility, 2025).

For this experiment, *MBFC's of 2022* original factual rating scale for media sources 0 to 10 (0–2 = Least Biased, 2–5 = Left/Right Center Bias, 5–8 = Left/Right Bias, 8–10 = Extreme Bias) was adjusted to a range of 1 to 10 (1–2 = Least Biased, 2–5 = Left/Right Center Bias, 5–8 = Left/Right Bias, 8 – 10 = Extreme Bias) to comply with *Microsoft Forms'* requirements, the software used to create the questionnaire, which only support ratings from 1 to 10.

These tools are particularly relevant for information scientists because they align directly with the core responsibilities of evaluating, organizing, and disseminating reliable information in digital environments. Unlike general audiences, information scientists are professionally trained to assess the credibility of information, navigate complex digital sources, and implement systems that support informed decision-making (Kaeophanuek et al., 2018). Their roles in promoting media and information literacy, including teaching others how to identify misinformation and use digital tools critically, closely intersect with the goals of these tools, which are designed to enhance critical evaluation skills and support responsible information consumption.

The questionnaire, developed using *Microsoft Forms*, was designed to ensure participant anonymity and support efficient data analysis. It comprised 56 questions, divided as follows:

13 questions were taken and adapted from the *Pew Research Center's* political typology framework to determine participants' ideological orientation (Pew Research Center, 2021).

36 questions, based on *MBFC of 2022*, were tailored to the 6 selected television channels and their coverage of the *Eavesdropping* news item (Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022).

The remaining 7 questions covered experimental instructions.

(For the full questionnaire, see Annex.)

The use of our model method can be well justified, particularly in light of recent advancements in fact-checking tools. The 2025 update of the Media Bias/Fact Check (MBFC) method significantly enhances its credibility by introducing a more systematic and transparent evaluation framework. By adopting a quantitative, weighted scoring system, MBFC of 2025 addresses earlier criticisms of subjectivity and offers greater objectivity, reproducibility, and clarity. Each factor contributing to the final rating is explicitly broken down, making the evaluation process more understandable and accessible for users (Media Bias/Fact Check, 2025).

While our experiment utilized the *MBFC of 2022*, the framework itself remains adaptable and can be employed with any structured fact-checking method in future research. This flexibility ensures the continued relevance and applicability of our approach in evolving media and information environments (Figure 1).


Fig. 1. A combined framework for analyzing personal bias and for evaluating media outlets/news items using fact-checking methodologies

3. Discussion

Evaluating media content, as well as the media outlets that produce and disseminate it is a central concern for information scientists in the age of digital information overload and misinformation. The spread of misinformation, along with the evolving nature of political and emotionally charged content, makes the need to strengthen critical evaluation skills through educational interventions more relevant than ever. However, human psychology, personal beliefs, and the structural biases of the media ecosystem continue to influence even trained evaluators. Considering these points, the following discussion is based on a review of contemporary literature. It focuses on two main research questions, as mentioned in the Materials and Methods section of this paper.

The literature highlights the importance of structured methodologies for evaluating media content. *MBFC's of 2022* approach aligns with established frameworks, such as Caulfield's four-step verification method, which involves checking for previous work, identifying the source, reading laterally, and circling back for reassessment (Caulfield, 2017). These methods aim to enhance critical thinking and reduce susceptibility to misinformation. *MBFC's of 2022* ratings have been widely used in media studies and disinformation research due to their reliability and consistency over time. For instance, as mentioned earlier, comparisons with other datasets, such as *NewsGuard Technologies* and *BuzzFeed India*, demonstrate strong agreement in identifying biased or low-factual news sources (Broniatowski et al., 2022; Kiesel et al., 2019).

Studies emphasize that fact-checking tools enhance evaluative accuracy by systematically targeting multiple critical dimensions such as emotional framing, rhetorical manipulation, and ideological bias (Baly et al., 2021). In addition to analytical rigor, *MBFC of 2022* also offers a robust, continually updated database of media sources, allowing users to access bias ratings and factual reliability assessments across thousands of news websites (Babaei et al., 2022). Furthermore, findings from the literature indicate that individuals who undergo training in structured frameworks are more adept at recognizing manipulative headlines, emotionally charged wording, and the origins of misinformation (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nakov et al., 2021). These outcomes are corroborated by other scientists' work, which confirms that content literacy education significantly enhances the detection of deceptive patterns in both digital and traditional media landscapes (Ali et al., 2022; Amazeen, Bucy, 2019).

Research indicates that employing multiple evaluation points, such as those incorporated in the *MBFC of 2022* framework, effectively mitigates the influence of superficial cues that might otherwise mislead untrained or inattentive individuals (Pomares, Guzmán, 2015; Truong, Tran, 2023). Participants who closely followed structured fact-checking criteria consistently delivered more accurate and calibrated assessments. This reinforces the broader claim that methodical, multi-step verification processes significantly reduce vulnerability to various forms of bias. Moreover, individuals who are well-informed about fact-checking strategies are generally more capable of assessing the credibility of news content, particularly when they engage with fact-checking practices on a sustained basis. Repeated exposure to such practices has been shown to enhance the ability to identify misinformation, even in content that extends beyond their initial learning context (Bowles et al., 2025).

Crucially, the presence of evidence-based reasoning within fact-checks further supports evaluative accuracy. Such fact-checks enhance understanding of political statements and reduce the persuasive impact of falsehoods, especially in emotionally charged or negative political advertisements. Fact-checking functions as a cognitive anchor during periods of informational saturation (Wintersieck et al., 2021). Additionally, fact-checking improves belief accuracy even in individuals holding firmly entrenched false beliefs, underscoring its resilience and practical efficacy across diverse cognitive contexts (Carnahan, Bergan, 2022).

As a result, it is reasonable to believe that well-informed individuals, especially experts like information scientists, are better equipped to assess news content objectively. However, upon closer examination, the situation proves to be more complex. Research shows that although fact-checking education can significantly improve how people evaluate information, this improvement is not consistent for everyone and does not fully protect against deeper personal and ideological biases.

A good example of this can be found in a study that highlights the fact that the success of fact-checking largely depends on how the message is presented, particularly who the source is believed to be. If the source is seen as politically neutral, people are more likely to trust the information. However, if the source appears to be politically biased, people are more likely to dismiss it. Most

people tend to judge the credibility of news through the lens of their existing political views, particularly in countries where media outlets are privately owned and not generally seen as neutral. This is a clear example of motivated reasoning, a mental process in which people interpret information in a way that supports what they already believe (Asano et al., 2021). Additionally, fact-checking messages labeled as originating from artificial intelligence systems or crowdsourced platforms are more effective in reducing partisan bias compared to those attributed to human experts. This suggests that not only does the fact-checking method matter, but so does its perceived origin, revealing the complex interplay between epistemological trust and identity-driven perception (Chung et al., 2024).

Echoing this perspective, other researchers find that fact-checking labels alone have limited impact on how users perceive the credibility of news, particularly when the content is politically charged (Oeldorf-Hirsch et al., 2024). Presenting a confirmed or disputed label does not significantly alter evaluative outcomes, unless the label aligns with the user's existing political orientation. This suggests that knowledge of fact-checking practices does not automatically override the ideological filters through which content is interpreted. Further empirical support demonstrates that political ideology, emotional disposition, and trust in media institutions continue to be significant news determinants in evaluation, even among methodologically trained individuals (Friggeri et al., 2014; Lazer et al., 2018; Vosoughi et al., 2018). A particularly telling finding is that partisans perceive neutral coverage from politically opposed outlets as biased, even after accounting for their prior beliefs about the outlet and the content (Lo Iacono, Daniel Dores Cruz, 2022). This demonstrates that personal bias significantly distorts the evaluative process, regardless of the level of training.

Additional studies demonstrate a divide in trust between digital-native and traditional media outlets, driven in part by structural changes in media business models and their perceived editorial transparency (Arianto et al., 2019; Horowitz, Lowe, 2020). Participants tended to favor digital outlets for their immediacy and peer-correction mechanisms, while others preferred traditional outlets based on institutional legacy (Tandoc, Maitra, 2017). These patterns reveal that media consumption is shaped not only by ideological affinity but also by the institutional framing of the source, rather than solely by factual content.

This is consistent with second-level agenda-setting theory (McCombs, Shaw, 1972), which explains how media not only influence what people think about, but also how they think about it. Participants in these studies often rated outlets that shared their worldview more favorably, even when the factual accuracy of content was equal or inferior. In this context, confirmation bias was evident even among trained individuals, underscoring the deep-rooted nature of ideological filtering.

The role of emotionally evocative content is another critical factor. Emotionally charged narratives, especially those framed around crisis, betrayal, or fear, can override essential mechanisms of reasoning (De Choudhury et al., 2024; Pennycook, Rand, 2019). These emotionally saturated messages deepen cognitive blind spots, polarize interpretation, and impair rational judgment, and this point is reinforced by other researchers showing that even trained professionals are vulnerable to subconscious leanings, particularly when evaluating emotionally or ideologically charged content (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Pennycook, Rand, 2021).

Well-informed individuals can, under certain conditions, evaluate news content more effectively, particularly when they are familiar with structured practices such as lateral reading. College students who received explicit instruction in lateral reading through the Digital Polarization Initiative curriculum showed measurable improvements in their ability to assess the trustworthiness of online information (Brodsky et. al., 2021). This suggests that fact-checking education can cultivate transferable skills, particularly when it incorporates analytical strategies grounded in critical reasoning and verification across multiple sources. However, such gains are not universally applicable or automatically activated. Even the conceptual frameworks and metaphors that underpin fact-checking strategies can carry ideological baggage themselves. The very language used to define misinformation shapes what is seen as problematic, how it is recognized, and what responses are considered legitimate (Eadon, Wood, 2025). This means that even a well-informed evaluator operates within a preconstructed ideational boundary, often without being aware of it.

Researchers have found that while training helps mitigate biases, it does not eliminate them. Interestingly, some studies suggest that well-informed individuals may appear less influenced by their biases than previously assumed; however, even then, this apparent resilience is conditional (Masood,

Tuzov, 2024; Rodrigo-Ginés et al., 2024). For instance, personal judgment remains relatively accurate only when individuals actively consult diverse or independent sources (Pachur, 2024).

Another critical factor is bounded rationality, the tendency of individuals to rely on heuristics or cognitive shortcuts rather than formal reasoning processes. Even well-informed individuals often depend on how easily they can process and reason through information, not on whether the content has undergone formal verification (Yang, 2022). Thus, unless information is presented in a cognitively accessible way, it may still be dismissed or misunderstood.

Exposure to dominant frames across trusted platforms continues to exert a systemic influence. Even informed individuals are susceptible to repeated messaging and salient omissions in public discourse, regardless of their training (Kilgo, 2021). Algorithmic content delivery, social group homophily, and confirmation bias reinforce existing preferences and encourage ideological insulation (Modi et. al., 2024).

The emotional and political entanglement of bias perceptions is also addressed by other researchers who show that even evaluations based on structural awareness can be skewed by personal ideology or identity-based affiliation (Gravesteijn et al., 2014). Furthermore, visual interventions designed to counter ideological bias consistently fail to override the effect of political alignment on perceived credibility (Spinde et al., 2022).

The Greek media ecosystem offers a clear case study of how structural conditions reinforce skepticism, even among well-informed audiences. Greek media are shaped by political affiliations, economic dependencies, and editorial control linked to ownership structures, all of which erode public trust (Serafini, Zagni, 2023). Participants in relevant studies frequently pointed to sponsored journalism or perceived political bias, even in factually accurate reporting. These tendencies align with agenda-setting theories (McCombs, Shaw, 1972), where ownership dynamics guide coverage priorities and suppress dissenting views. As a result, articles from ideologically opposed outlets were often dismissed. At the same time, those from sympathetic media were overvalued despite flaws, highlighting once again how critical thinking alone cannot overcome entrenched bias.

The utility of *MBFC of 2022* as a fact-checking framework is validated across the literature, but its limitations are also acknowledged. Its subjective methodology raises concerns about consistency and replicability. Still, it remains a powerful tool for cultivating fact-checking literacy, which significantly enhances the objectivity of news assessment, even if it doesn't eliminate bias. Addressing the enduring role of personal bias requires not only cognitive awareness, but also collaborative verification strategies and structural changes in how information is presented and consumed (Vinhas, Bastos, 2021).

Lastly, even expert evaluations are vulnerable to human error (D'Alonzo, Tegmark, 2022). Researchers advocate for automated, data-driven systems over manual, human-led assessments, emphasizing their greater resistance to subjective influence. Supporting this view, other research points out that the need to anonymize speaker identity for coders and rely on data over judgment suggests that even experts are not exempt from bias, a conclusion with profound implications for the future of reliable media evaluation (Kim et al., 2022).

In an era dominated by misinformation and digital saturation, developing robust media evaluation skills is more vital than ever. In summary, research reveals that structured fact-checking training, utilizing methodologies such as Caulfield's approach and *MBFC of 2022*, enhances evaluative accuracy, improves pattern recognition, and reduces susceptibility to manipulative content. However, persistent ideological bias, emotional framing, and trust issues surrounding source neutrality often limit the full impact of these interventions. While tools like *MBFC of 2022* and strategies such as lateral reading offer measurable benefits, their effectiveness is conditional, influenced by factors like political alignment, algorithmic exposure, and users' identity-driven biases. Moreover, even trained individuals rely on cognitive shortcuts and remain vulnerable to emotionally charged narratives. Thus, although structured evaluation frameworks significantly improve misinformation detection, their success depends on ongoing practice, diverse information exposure, and potentially, the integration of automated systems to counteract human subjectivity and ideological insulation. To this end, it is interesting to see what the results of the present research reveal.

4. Results

The primary ideological leaning for each of the 8 anonymous faculty participants (Ppt.) was determined based on the category with the highest percentage of responses to questions 2 through

14, which were adapted from the *Pew Research Center's* political orientation survey (see Annex), and is summarized as follows (Table 1):

Table 1. Political orientation of each anonymous participant

Ppt.	Far left, %	Left, %	Center left,%	Center, %	Center right, %	Right, %	Far right, %	Main political leaning
A1	8	31	15	15	23	0	8	left
A2	15	31	15	8	15	8	8	left
A3	0	23	8	23	15	23	8	centrist/mix
A4	23	39	15	15	8	0	0	left
A5	15	46	15	8	8	0	8	left
A6	23	30	15	8	8	8	8	left
A7	31	46	15	0	8	0	0	strongly left
A8	0	15	15	8	15	39	8	right

The 13 responses from each of the 8 anonymous teaching members of the Department of Archival, Library, and Information Studies at the University of West Attica, totaling 104 answers to 13 closed questions (see questions 2-14 in Annex), indicate that their horizontal political profile can be described as follows: of the 8 participants, 5 (A1, A2, A4, A5, and A6) were classified as left-leaning, while 1 participant (A7) demonstrated a strongly left-leaning orientation, with particularly high proportions of responses in both the left (46 %) and far-left (31 %) categories. Participant A3 exhibited a balanced distribution across the political spectrum, with equal percentages (23 %) in the left, center, and right categories, and was therefore classified as centrist or ideologically mixed. In contrast, participant A8 displayed a clear right-leaning orientation, with the highest share of responses (39 %) aligning with the right category. Overall, the distribution of ideological leanings among the participants included 5 left-leaning, 1 strongly left-leaning, 1 centrist/mix, and 1 right-leaning individual.

In more detail, participant A1's responses to questions 2 through 14 indicate a range of political orientations, with 31 % of answers aligning with a left-leaning position, the highest proportion observed. This is followed by 23 % of responses reflecting a center-right orientation, and 15 % each corresponding to center and center-left positions. Although the distribution suggests some ideological diversity, particularly around the political center, the predominance of left-oriented responses suggests that Participant A1's overall political leaning can be characterized as left-leaning.

Participant A2's responses to questions 2 through 14 reveal a varied political profile, with 31 % of answers indicating a left-leaning orientation, the most prominent category. Additional responses were evenly distributed among far-left (15 %), center-left (15 %), and center-right (15 %), with smaller shares attributed to center (8 %), right (8 %), and far-right (8 %). Despite the presence of ideological diversity, particularly around moderate and adjacent positions, the predominance of left-aligned responses suggests that Participant A2's overall political leaning can be classified as left-leaning.

Participant A3's responses to questions 2 through 14 indicate a relatively balanced political orientation. The highest proportions of responses, 23 % each, align with the left, center, and right categories, while smaller percentages fall into center-left (8 %), center-right (15 %), and far-right (8 %) categories. Notably, there are no responses associated with the far-left. This distribution suggests that Participant A3 does not exhibit a clear ideological bias toward either end of the political spectrum. Instead, the pattern reflects a centrist or ideologically mixed political leaning.

Participant A4's responses to questions 2 through 14 strongly indicate a left-leaning political orientation. A significant majority of the responses, 39 % and 23 %, align with left and far-left positions, respectively, while an additional 15 % corresponds to center-left. Responses indicating centrist or center-right views account for a combined 23 %, with no responses falling into the right

or far-right categories. This distribution reveals a pronounced tendency toward progressive or leftist views. Therefore, Participant A4's overall political leaning can be characterized as left-leaning, with a notable inclination toward the more progressive end of the spectrum.

Participant A5's responses to questions 2 through 14 indicate a distinctly left-leaning political orientation. Nearly half (46 %) of the responses align with a left position, while an additional 30 % fall within far-left and center-left categories. In contrast, only a small fraction of responses corresponds to centrist (8 %), center-right (8 %), and far-right (8 %) perspectives, with no representation on the right. This distribution demonstrates a clear ideological inclination toward progressive or left-aligned viewpoints. Accordingly, Participant A5's overall political leaning can be characterized as left-leaning, with strong consistency across responses.

Participant A6's responses to questions 2 through 14 suggest a predominantly left-oriented political stance. A combined 68 % of responses fall into the far-left (23 %), left (30 %), and center-left (15 %) categories, indicating a strong alignment with progressive or left-leaning views. The remaining responses are evenly distributed across center, center-right, right, and far-right positions, each accounting for only 8 %. Despite this minor ideological variation, the clear majority of responses reflect a consistent preference for left-leaning perspectives. Therefore, Participant A6's overall political leaning can be classified as left-leaning.

Participant A7's responses to questions 2 through 14 reveal a strong and consistent left-oriented political stance. A significant majority of responses, 31 % far-left, 46 % left, and 15 % center-left, amount to 92 % of the total, clearly indicating a progressive or left-leaning ideological profile. With only 8 % of responses falling into the center-right category and none aligning with centrist, right, or far-right positions, the data shows minimal ideological diversity. Therefore, Participant A7's overall political leaning can be confidently characterized as strongly left-leaning.

Participant A8's responses to questions 2 through 14 indicate a political orientation that leans predominantly to the right. The highest proportion of responses (39 %) align with a right-leaning position, supported by an additional 15 % in center-right and 8 % in far-right categories. While 15 % of responses fall within both the left and center-left, and 8 % reflect centrist views, the overall distribution is clearly weighted toward conservative perspectives. Therefore, Participant A8's political leaning can be classified as right-leaning.

In summary, most anonymous respondents exhibit a political profile with left-wing bias.

The following figures and data present detailed findings from evaluating each of the 6 anonymized mass media outlets, mapped back to their identified channels at the last phase of the experiment (see Annex questions 16 through 50 adapted from Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022, and questions 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56 added by the researchers. Note that questions 15, 21, 27, 33, 39, and 45 are instructions for the participants.

In questions 16, 17, and 18, 87.5 % of respondents considered the news presented by Mass Media 1 to be politically biased, while 12.5 % viewed it as neutral (Figure 2).

Question 19 (was the news item from Media Outlet 1 broadcast by a media outlet that supports a specific political ideology?) focused on the outlet's political orientation. In this case, 62.5 % perceived bias: 25 % identified a right-wing leaning, 25 % center-left, and 12.5 % left-wing. The remaining 37.5 % viewed the outlet as politically neutral.

During the blind evaluation (question 20: based on the news item you heard from Media Outlet 1, how would you generally characterize the political orientation of the outlet?), where the outlet's identity was unknown, responses were divided: 37.5 % considered it neutral, another 37.5 % identified it as center-left, and 25 % as right-wing. When the outlet was later revealed as *MEGA* (question 53), the assessment shifted to the right: 37.5 % described it as center-right, another 37.5 % as right-wing, and 25 % as center-left.

In summary, Mass Media 1 (*MEGA*) was perceived more moderately in the blind evaluation, with only 25 % of anonymous respondents classifying it as right-wing. However, it was viewed as leaning more decisively to the right (75 %) in the known evaluation. This suggests that brand recognition influenced perceptions, increasing the tendency to associate *MEGA* with a right-leaning bias.

Fig. 2. Mass Media 1

Fig. 3. Mass Media 2

According to all respondents (100 %) in questions 22, 23, and 24 (see Annex), the news item aired by Mass Media 2 was perceived as politically biased (Figure 3).

In question 25, which explicitly asked about the outlet's political orientation, the same unanimous judgment of bias was observed. Among the participants, 50 % described Mass Media 2 as right-wing, 37.5 % as center-right, and 12.5 % as far-right. None considered it politically neutral.

When the outlet's identity was concealed (blind evaluation, question 26), 62.5 % of participants identified its stance as right-wing, and 37.5 % as center-right. In the corresponding known evaluation (question 51), where the outlet was revealed as *ERT*, 50 % characterized it as right-wing, 37.5 % as center-right, and 12.5 % as neutral.

In summary, the 8 anonymous, predominantly left-leaning respondents unanimously viewed Mass Media 2 (*ERT*) as politically biased, primarily leaning toward the right-wing spectrum, both in blind and non-blind evaluations.


Fig. 4. Mass Media 3

In questions 28, 29, and 30 (see Annex), 79.2 % of respondents described the news item aired by Mass Media 3 as politically biased, while 20.8 % considered it neutral (Figure 4).

In question 31, which asked about the political orientation of the outlet, 87.5 % perceived a bias: 12.5 % identified it as right-wing, 25 % as center-right, 50 % as left-wing, and 12.5 % as neutral.

During the blind evaluation (question 32), where the outlet's identity was concealed, 50 % of participants classified it as left-wing, 37.5 % as center-right, and 12.5 % as neutral. The pattern shifted when the outlet was revealed as *ANT1* (question 56): 50 % described it as center-right, 37.5 % as right-wing, and only 12.5 % as left-wing.

In summary, Mass Media 3 (*ANT1*) was perceived as left-leaning in the blind evaluation but shifted to a predominantly right-wing classification in the known evaluation. According to the 8 anonymous, mostly left-leaning participants, the outlet demonstrated an overall bias rate of 87.5 %, aligning with the broader finding that 79.2 % of participants judged its news content as politically biased.

In questions 34, 35, and 36 (see Annex), 87.5 % of respondents characterized the news presented by Mass Media 4 as politically biased, while 12.5 % considered it neutral (Figure 5).

In question 37, which focused on identifying the outlet's political leaning, 87.5 % again perceived a political bias. Specifically, 37.5 % labeled it as right-wing, 25 % as center-right, another 12.5 % also as center-right, 12.5 % as far-left, and 12.5 % believed the outlet had no specific ideological alignment.

During the blind evaluation (question 38), where the outlet's identity was not disclosed, opinions varied: 50 % described it as right-wing, 12.5 % as center-right, 12.5 % as neutral, 12.5 % as center-left, and 12.5 % as far-left. When the outlet was revealed as *STAR* in the known evaluation (question 55), perceptions became more concentrated, with 75 % identifying it as center-right and 25 % as right-wing.


Fig. 5. Mass Media 4

In summary, Mass Media 4 was primarily perceived as politically biased across all evaluations. While responses in the blind evaluation varied across the political spectrum, the named evaluation (*STAR*) produced a strong consensus toward a center-right alignment. Overall, 87.5 % of participants considered the outlet's news content biased, which indicates a clear perception of political leaning, regardless of whether the outlet's identity was known.

In questions 40, 41, and 42 (see Annex), 87.5 % of participants considered the news aired by Mass Media 5 politically biased, while 12.5 % perceived it as neutral (Figure 6).

Question 43 further explored the outlet's political orientation. Among respondents, 87.5 % identified a political bias: 37.5 % toward the right, 37.5 % toward the center-right, and 12.5 % toward the left. Only 12.5 % saw no affiliation with any political ideology.

In the blind evaluation (question 44), where the identity of the outlet was concealed, 50 % characterized Mass Media 5 as right-wing, 25 % as center-right, 12.5 % as neutral, and 12.5 % as left-wing. When the outlet was later revealed as *OPEN* (question 54), responses were evenly split: 25 % each identified it as left-wing, center-left, center-right, and right-wing.

Fig. 6. Mass Media 5

In summary, Mass Media 5 (*OPEN*) was considered politically biased by most respondents (87.5 %) and was predominantly perceived as leaning toward the right-wing spectrum in the blind evaluation; however, opinions diversified once the outlet's identity was revealed.


Fig. 7. Mass Media 6

In questions 46, 47, and 48 (see Annex), 95.9 % of participants described the news presented by Mass Media 6 as politically biased, while only 4.1 % considered it neutral (Figure 7).

In question 49, which asked about the outlet's political orientation, 87.5 % of respondents perceived a bias: 37.5 % identified it as right-wing, 25 % as center-right, and 25 % as left-wing. The remaining 12.5 % did not associate it with any specific political direction.

During the blind evaluation (question 50), where the outlet's identity was concealed, 37.5 % characterized Mass Media 6 as right-wing, 25 % as center-right, 25 % as left-wing, and 12.5 % as neutral. When the outlet was later revealed as *ALPHA* (question 52), 50 % identified it as center-right, 37.5 % as right-wing, and 12.5 % as center-left.

In summary, the 8 anonymous, predominantly left-leaning respondents consistently viewed Mass Media 6 (*ALPHA*) as politically biased, primarily leaning toward the right spectrum. Overall, the perception of bias in its news content reached 95.9 %.

Each media outlet (*MEGA, ERT, ANT1, STAR, OPEN, ALPHA*) features two side-by-side bars. The left bar represents blind evaluations (outlet identity unknown), while the right bar represents named evaluations (outlet identity revealed). *MEGA, ANT1,* and *ALPHA* exhibit reduced neutrality and increased right-leaning perceptions when the outlet name is disclosed. *ERT* maintains a consistently strong right-wing perception in both phases. *STAR* and *OPEN* demonstrate a consolidation of responses toward the center-right and right during the known phase. *OPEN* is notable for exhibiting more ideological diversity in the blind phase, which levels out across the spectrum when the outlet is known (Figure 8).


Fig. 8. Perceived Political Orientation of Media Outlets (Unknown vs. Known Evaluation

Across all 6 media outlets, the perception of political bias in news reporting was notably high, ranging from 79.2 % to 100 %. Blind evaluations typically produced more politically diverse responses, while known evaluations tended to shift perceptions, especially toward the right, for specific outlets. The left-leaning orientation of most respondents may have contributed to a more critical view of outlets that align with center-right or right-wing positions. Mass Media 3 (*ANT1*) stood out as the least biased in blind conditions, while Mass Media 2 (*ERT*) was judged as the most uniformly biased.

5. Conclusion

In an age marked by digital saturation and widespread misinformation, developing strong media evaluation skills is more critical than ever. Existing research demonstrates that structured fact-checking methods such as Caulfield's lateral reading approach and tools like Media Bias/Fact Check, can improve people's accuracy in evaluating information, enhance their ability to detect patterns of bias, and reduce their susceptibility to manipulative content. However, these benefits are often tempered by persistent ideological bias, emotional framing, and skepticism about the neutrality of information sources.

While tools like *MBFC of 2022* and strategies like lateral reading offer measurable value, their effectiveness is influenced by factors such as political alignment, algorithmic exposure, and personal identity. Even trained individuals frequently rely on cognitive shortcuts and remain vulnerable to emotionally charged narratives. These challenges highlight the difficulty of achieving entirely objective media assessments, even within structured evaluation frameworks.

The present study supports and extends these findings. Participants, who mainly were left-leaning, perceived all assessed media outlets as biased. When the identities of the outlets were disclosed, participants were more likely to rate them as having a more substantial right-wing bias. Although the use of the *MBFC of 2022* tool improved evaluative consistency among participants, their political views still influenced their judgments. This outcome highlights the persistent influence of confirmation bias, even among individuals who have received some form of media literacy training and underscores the complexity of promoting impartial evaluations in politically polarized environments.

Despite its limited scope, the research provides valuable insights into how political bias in the media is perceived and evaluated. At the same time, it is important to recognize the study's limitations. Acknowledging these constraints helps clarify the scope of the findings and identifies areas where future research is needed. This was an exploratory, controlled pilot study, intended more as a starting point for discussion and reflection than as a source of definitive conclusions.

Like any emerging methodology, the evaluation framework introduced here, including the use of *MBFC of 2022*, requires adaptation to *MBFC of 2025*, further testing and validation. Its long-term value will depend on how reliably it performs across different populations and settings. One significant limitation of this study is the small and relatively homogeneous sample. While suitable for a pilot design, the limited diversity among participants restricts the broad applicability of the findings. Future research should engage larger, more diverse samples, that represent a wider range of political perspectives and backgrounds, to understand better how perceived media bias varies across the ideological spectrum.

Additionally, while there is a growing body of literature on media perception and bias detection, few studies have experimentally tested MBFC-style evaluation approaches. This research, therefore, represents an initial step in what should become a broader and more comprehensive field of study. Future work could refine the methodology, examine its consistency over time, and explore how it might be effectively integrated into educational programs or journalistic practice.

In summary, although modest in scale, this study marks a meaningful entry point for the empirical examination of structured media bias evaluation. It highlights both the promise and the challenges of improving critical media literacy in a polarized information environment. By encouraging further investigation and refinement, it contributes to the ongoing effort to promote more informed, critical, and resilient media consumers.

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Appendix

Full Survey Questions

Q#	Survey Question
1 – (Instruction)	I acknowledge that I have been informed about the purpose of this anonymous survey and voluntarily agree to participate.
2 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ I support a government that emphasizes a strengthened public sector and expanded social services. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*). ▪ I support a government that prioritizes a strengthened private sector and the expansion of private services. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning*). ▪ I support a government that pursues a balanced approach to the development of both public and private sectors (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly center-leaning*).
3 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ The openness of our country to people from around the world is a fundamental aspect of our national identity (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning, center-left leaning and to a lesser extent center-leaning*). ▪ Excessive openness to people from around the world may distort our national identity (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning and far-right-leaning*).
4 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ In general, experts who have studied a subject for many years are usually better at making policy decisions on that subject than other people (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning*). ▪ In general, experts who have studied a subject for many years are usually worse at making political decisions about that issue than other people (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint may resonate more with populist or anti-elitist sentiments, which can appear on both the far-left and far-right.*). ▪ In general, experts who have studied a subject for many years are neither better nor worse at making political decisions about that issue than other people (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly center-leaning*).
5 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ Our country's increasing engagement in international trade is likely beneficial, as it promotes business competition and helps lower

Q#	Survey Question
	the prices of goods and services (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning*). ▪ Our country's increasing engagement in international trade is likely detrimental, as it intensifies business competition, which may lead to job losses—particularly among smaller firms – and/or lower wages in certain employment sectors (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*).
6 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	To what extent do you believe additional efforts are needed to ensure equal rights for all individuals residing in our country, regardless of their racial or ethnic background? ▪ A great deal (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*). ▪ A little (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly center-leaning and some right-leaning*). ▪ None (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly far right-leaning*).
7 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ Business groups generally earn excessively high profits. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*). ▪ Most business groups earn profits that are fair and reasonable. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning*).
8 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ Our country, as a cradle of civilization, is the greatest nation in the world. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly far right-leaning*). ▪ Our country is among the best in the world. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly center-leaning and/or right-leaning*). ▪ There are countries in the world that are better than ours. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*).
9 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ It is a major problem that people say things that are deeply offensive to others (e.g., regarding their country of origin). (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*). ▪ People sometimes say offensive things to others, but this is a minor problem. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning*). ▪ Although people may say offensive things to others, this is not a problem. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly far right-leaning*).
10 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ I usually vote for a political party regardless of the personality of its leader. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning or/and far left-leaning*). ▪ I usually vote for a political party based on the personality of its leader. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly center-leaning or/and right-leaning*).
11 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	In general, to what extent do you believe Greeks benefit from societal advantages that are not available to foreigners? ▪ Very much (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly far-right leaning*). ▪ Quite a lot (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning and center-leaning*). ▪ Not very much (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*).

Q#	Survey Question
12 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Overall, how would you assess the length of sentences given to individuals convicted of crimes in this country? ▪ They serve excessively long sentences. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*). ▪ They serve sentences that are too short. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning*). ▪ They receive an appropriate length of sentence. *(Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly center-leaning*).
13 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ The church should be separate from the state. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly left-leaning*). ▪ The state and the church should be united. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning*).
14 – (Adapted from Pew Research Center, 2021)	Please select the statement that best reflects your viewpoint: ▪ Our country should maintain or increase spending on national defense equipment. *(Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly right-leaning, center-right and center-leaning*). ▪ Our country should reduce spending on national defense equipment. (*Note for researchers: In Greece this viewpoint is mainly far-left-leaning*).
15 – (Instruction-News Item from Media Outlet 1) **Note**: *Questions 21, 27, 33, 39, and 45 are identical to Question 16 and refer to the same news story as presented by* **Media Outlets 2**, **3**, **4**, **5**, *and* **6**, *respectively.*	(Blind question) Please listen to a political news story as it was presented by six major Greek media outlets. Then, evaluate the news item from Media Outlet 1 based on the questions that follow. I have listened to the news item from Media Outlet 1.
16 – (Adapted from Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022) **Note**: *Questions 22, 28, 34, 40, and 46 are identical to Question 16 and refer to the same news story as presented by* **Media Outlets 2**, **3**, **4**, **5**, *and* **6**, *respectively.*	(Blind question) The news item from Media Outlet 1 uses emotionally charged language to evoke feelings and influence the listener, and its headline does not align well with the story. Please rate it on a scale from 1 to 10 according to the following criteria: 1–2: Does not use emotionally charged language to influence the listener, and the headline fits the story very well or fairly well. 2–5: Likely uses emotionally charged language to influence the listener in favor of the **Center-Left** or **Center-Right** (*Please select only one.*). 5–8: Likely uses emotionally charged language to influence the listener in favor of the **Left** or the **Right** (*Please select only one.*). 8–10: Likely uses emotionally charged language to influence the listener in favor of the **Far-Left** or **Far-Right** (*Please select only one.*).
17 – (Adapted from Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022) **Note**: *Questions 23, 29, 35, 41, and 47 are identical to Question 17 and refer to the same news story as presented by* **Media Outlets 2**, **3**, **4**, **5**,	(Blind question) The news item from Media Outlet 1 presents well-documented information and supports its claims with credible sources (e.g., by citing other sources). Please rate it on a scale from 1 to 10 based on the following criteria: 1–2: Provides well-documented information and supports its claims with high-quality, reliable sources (e.g., cites multiple independent sources). 2–5: Provides documented information but primarily supports its claims with sources aligned with the **Center-Left** or **Center-Right** (*Please select only one.*).

Q#	Survey Question
and 6, respectively.	5–8: Provides documented information but primarily supports its claims with sources aligned with the **Left** or the **Right** *(Please select only one.)*. 8–10: Provides documented information but primarily supports its claims with sources aligned with the **Far-Left** or **Far-Right** *(Please select only one.)*.
18 – (Adapted from Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022) *Note: Questions 24, 30, 36, 42, and 48 are identical to Question 18 and refer to the same news story as presented by **Media Outlets 2**, **3**, **4**, **5**, and **6**, respectively.*	(Blind question) Does the news item from Media Outlet 1 present information and viewpoints from multiple perspectives, or mainly from one? Please rate it on a scale from 1 to 10 using the following criteria: 1–2: Presents information and viewpoints from multiple perspectives. 2–5: Primarily presents information and viewpoints from one side, aligned with the **Center-Left** or **Center-Right** *(Please select only one.)*. 5–8: Primarily presents information and viewpoints from one side, aligned with the **Left** or the **Right** *(Please select only one.)*. 8–10: Primarily presents information and viewpoints from one side, aligned with the **Far-Left** or **Far-Right** *(Please select only one.)*.
19 – (Adapted from Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022) *Note: Questions 25, 31, 37, 43, and 49 are identical to Question 19 and refer to the same news story as presented by **Media Outlets 2**, **3**, **4**, **5**, and **6**, respectively.*	(Blind question) In your opinion, was the news item from Media Outlet 1 broadcast by a media outlet that supports a specific political ideology? Please rate it on a scale from 1 to 10 using the following criteria: 1–2: In my opinion, the news item was presented by a media outlet that does not clearly support a specific political ideology. 2–5: In my opinion, the news item was presented by a media outlet that likely supports the **Center-Left** or **Center-Right** *(Please select only one.)*. 5–8: In my opinion, the news item was presented by a media outlet that likely supports the **Left** or the **Right** *(Please select only one.)*. 8–10: In my opinion, the news item was presented by a media outlet that likely supports the **Far-Left** or **Far-Right** *(Please select only one.)*.
20 – (Adapted from Media Bias/Fact Check, 2022) *Note: Questions 26, 32, 38, 44, and 50 are identical to Question 20 and refer to the same news story as presented by **Media Outlets 2**, **3**, **4**, **5**, and **6**, respectively.*	(Blind question) Based on the news item you heard from Media Outlet 1, how would you generally characterize the political orientation of the outlet? *(Please select only one.)*. ▪ Neutral ▪ Center-Left ▪ Center-Right ▪ Left ▪ Right ▪ Far-Left ▪ Far-Right
51 – (This question was added by the researchers to examine whether the known identity of each media outlet influences participants' perceptions.) *Note: Questions 52, 53, 54, 55, and 56 are*	In your opinion, does ERT support a specific political ideology? Please select the option that best reflects your view *(Please select only one.)*: ▪ In my opinion, it does not clearly support any specific political ideology. ▪ In my opinion, it likely supports the Center-Left. ▪ In my opinion, it likely supports the Center-Right. ▪ In my opinion, it likely supports the Left. ▪ In my opinion, it likely supports the Right. ▪ In my opinion, it likely supports the Far-Left. ▪ In my opinion, it likely supports the Far-Right.

Q#	Survey Question
identical to Question 51 but refer to the media outlets ALPHA, MEGA, OPEN, STAR, and ANT1, respectively.	249

Note: *In blind questions*
- *Unknown Media Outlet 1 was MEGA*
- *Unknown Media Outlet 2 was ERT*
- *Unknown Media Outlet 3 was ANT1*
- *Unknown Media Outlet 4 was STAR*
- *Unknown Media Outlet 5 was OPEN*
- *Unknown Media Outlet 6 was ALPHA*